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Abstract
William Lane Craig is the most recognizable contemporary defender of the kalam 
cosmological argument. The argument, in its simplest form, is that (i) Whatever begins to 
exist has a cause of its existence, (ii) The universe began to exist, and (iii) Therefore, the 
universe has a cause of its existence. In defending this argument, he claims that it 
presupposes the theory of time commonly referred to as the A-theory of time, which is 
roughly the view that time really does flow from the nonexistent future into the present, 
and then out of existence into the past. Though this may be the commonsense view of 
time, it is not the view held by many philosophers and physicists. Because Craig’s 
argument relies on a controversial view of time, the argument in my view carries an 
unnecessary burden of proof on behalf of the A-theory. My thesis, then, is to argue in 
support of the kalam cosmological argument, but also to argue against Craig’s claim that 
it must be dependent on the A-theory of time, the result of which will be a more general 
yet stronger version of the kalam cosmological argument for the existence of God. 
Introduction
 In his defense of the kalam cosmological argument, William Lane Craig defends 
the theory of time commonly referred to as the A-theory.1 According to the A-theory, time 
exists approximately the way we experience it, with future moments constantly coming 
into existence and present moments always moving from existence into the past. On this 
view, the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist.2 The opposing view, the 
B-theory, holds that the whole of time exists as a totality, that the past, present and future 
are all equally real, and that moments in time stand in relations of earlier-than, 
simultaneous-with, and later-than to other moments in time.
Metcalfe, Curtis, 2013, UMSL, p.2
1 Craig’s original book-length defense of the argument is The KALAM Cosmological Argument, Wipf and 
Stock Publishers, 1979. The terminology of the A-theory and B-theory of time comes from J. Ellis 
McTaggart in “The Unreality of Time” Mind, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 68 (Oct., 1908), pp. 457-474.
2 This description is admittedly general. I do not mean to imply that all A-theorists are also Presentists--that 
would probably be false. However, at least something like a weak version of presentism seems to exist in 
almost every version of the A-theory.
 A thorough review of the literature on the kalam cosmological argument does not 
appear to uncover much on the possibility of a non-A-theory-dependent version of the 
argument. Yet something like the B-theory is held by many contemporary philosophers 
and cosmologists. I aim to defend of version of the kalam cosmological argument that 
does not depend on the A-theory, and if I am successful, then one cannot dismiss the 
argument on the grounds that it relies on a controversial view of time. To that end, I look 
at the argument as Craig defends it, including the historical medieval arguments for and 
against the existence of the actual infinite, and conclude that the actual infinite cannot 
exist. I then argue that the impossibility of an actual infinite is compatible with the B-
theory of time. Lastly, I look briefly to some contemporary cosmology in light of the big 
bang model, and argue that the universe is not past eternal. If I can make the argument 
that the universe is finite in the past, and if it does not require us to to adopt an A-theory 
of time, then I should be able to demonstrate that the kalam cosmological argument can 
be defended on the B-theory of time. 
1. The Historical Setting of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
 Though there are many cosmological arguments for the existence of God, the 
kalam version of the argument has its roots in a specific time and place in the history of 
philosophy. The argument comes from the medieval Arabic kalam tradition. Kalam in 
Arabic means, literally, “speech,” but refers in this case to the position of the Islamic 
speculative theologians, which is distinct from the school known as falsafa, or 
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philosophy, which was largely influenced by Aristotle and the later Aristotelians.3 Some 
of the arguments against the eternity of the world given by the kalam thinkers come from 
the anti-Aristotelian Christian theologian, John Philoponus, whom they knew as Yahya 
al-Nahwi.4 Although many in the medieval Arab-speaking world contributed to the kalam 
cosmological argument, Craig argues that three thinkers were the most important 
defenders: al-Kindi, the Jewish philosopher Saadia, and al-Ghazali. Of those, I will look 
only at al-Ghazali, who argues against the existence of the actual infinite. In a later 
section, I will consider an argument from Avicenna, (who does not dismiss the possibility 
of the existence of the actual infinite) against the possibility of the past infinity of the 
universe. The goal will be to show that on the arguments of either al-Ghazali or Avicenna, 
the universe itself is not past eternal.
 Al-Ghazali represents at once both a high point in the kalam tradition, and a blow 
to the Neo-Platonic, Aristotelian synthesis found in Islamic philosophers like Avicenna.5 
Al-Ghazali’s Incoherence of the Philosophers is a sustained argument against many of the 
arguments from the philosophers of the falsafa tradition; arguments al-Ghazali studied 
before ultimately rejecting them. He offers a variety of arguments to show that the 
universe cannot be infinitely old, and that an actual infinite cannot exist. He argues, for 
example, that the temporal phenomena in the world are caused by other temporal 
phenomena, which are caused by other temporal phenomena, and so on, ad infinitum, 
Metcalfe, Curtis, 2013, UMSL, p.4
3 Craig, 1979, p. 4, and McGinnis, Jon, "Arabic and Islamic Natural Philosophy and Natural Science", The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/arabic-islamic-natural/.
4 Craig, 1979, p. 8.
5 Ibid., p. 42.
unless the series stops with the eternal, that is, something outside of the series of temporal 
phenomena. He thinks the series of temporal causes cannot run backward into infinity, so 
there must be a ground of the causes, that is, the eternal.6 
 But in order to understand fully the arguments concerning whether or not the 
universe is past eternal, we need to get clear about the distinction between the potential 
and actual infinities. An actual infinite is a determined whole, a totality. An actual infinite 
refers to the actualization of a potential infinite. A potential infinite, for example, is like 
what we mean when we say that a distance can be divided infinitely many times. In such 
a case, we could never reach a point at which we had divided an actually infinite number 
of times, for we could always divide once more. At least conceptually, there is no 
smallest unit of division or last divisible part of any finite segment. Although we could (at  
least potentially) divide a line infinitely many times, such an accomplishment could never 
be completed. In the relevant sense what we mean in these cases is that the amount of 
possible divisions is indefinite. It moves constantly toward infinity without ever reaching 
it, since the actual infinite is not a limiting concept but a determined and completed 
whole. So then, according to Craig, things like tensed, dynamic moments in time or 
planetary rotations throughout the history of the universe are not actually infinite, they 
are potentially infinite at best. They progress in a linear fashion, always increasing toward 
infinity but never reaching a point at which they become actually infinite. So, if time is 
like the A-theory describes, it is merely potentially infinite--at no point does it “reach” or 
“achieve” the actual infinite.  
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6 Ibid., p. 45. Craig argues that al-Ghazali did not believe in secondary causes, but he likely presented the 
argument in a way that his opponents would accept.
 Al-Ghazali gives us several arguments to show that accepting the existence of the 
actual infinite leads to absurdities in the real world. For example, if the universe is 
infinitely old, then two planets that have been rotating at different rates for an infinite 
amount of time will both have rotated an actually infinite number of times, even if one 
will have completed twice or ten times as many rotations. Furthermore, the number of 
rotations for any of the planets will have to be either even or odd, yet an infinity is neither 
even nor odd. Equally strange is the idea that if the universe is infinitely old, then there 
will be an actual infinite number of human souls, something al-Ghazali thinks is 
unacceptable.7 These type of results are absurd, so al-Ghazali thinks the universe cannot 
be infinitely old. 
 We might argue that al-Ghazali did not have the tools to understand the infinite 
that we do today, namely, set theory. These different “sizes” of infinities can be to a large 
degree explained if we understand that they possess the same cardinalities. These sets are 
infinite just in case they can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with each other. That 
is, a set and a proper subset can both be infinite, even though one seems “smaller” than 
the other. For example, we can see this if we match up all the natural numbers with the 
subset of all the even numbers:
 {1,  2,  3,  4,  5,...}
 {2,  4,  6,  8,  10,...}
Or, as in the case of planetary rotations, if Planet X rotates once for every 12 rotations of 
the Planet Y:
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7 Ibid., p. 46-47, and McGinnis, Jon “Creation and eternity in Medieval philosophy” in Blackwell 
Companion to the Philosophy of Time, eds. A. Bardon and H. Dyke, Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2013.
 Planet X {1,   2,   3,   4,   5,…}
 Planet Y {12, 24, 36, 48, 60,…}
Intuitively, the even numbers appear to be half as many as the natural numbers, and 
Planet Y appears to rotate 12 times more often than Planet X, but they each have the same 
cardinal number, and both are said to be infinite because of the one-to-one 
correspondence in which they can be placed. However unintuitive, there are as many in 
the one set as there are in the corresponding set. 
 But even if set theory helps us understand and use infinity in our mathematics, it 
does not commit us to anything in reality; the seemingly absurd results can be confined to 
the mathematics.8 So al-Ghazali would presumably not feel any differently about the 
existence of these infinities in reality. But I am not particularly concerned with these 
types of paradoxes, because on the B-theory time is not formed by successive addition, 
and there is no real temporal regress of events that have passed from existence. On the B-
theory, all of the moments of time exist tenselessly at once, so the absurdities discussed 
by al-Ghazali do not arise. 
2. Craig’s Formulation of the Kalam Cosmological Argument
When the kalam cosmological argument is discussed in a contemporary setting, it is 
nearly always in reference to the version advanced by William Lane Craig. He puts the 
argument in its simplest form into the following syllogism:
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8 Except, perhaps on certain types of Platonism or realism about mathematical entities and abstract objects. 
But even then, as J.P. Moreland argues, the actual existence of numbers or abstract objects on Platonism are 
in a platonic realm, not here in spacetime, which is where I am arguing an actual infinite cannot exist. See 
Moreland, J. P. “A Response to a Platonistic and to a Set-Theoretic Objection to the Kalam Cosmological 
Argument” Religious Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 373-390.
 1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
 2. The universe began to exist.
 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence. 
Most of Craig’s own writing has been committed to defending the second premise, on 
both scientific and philosophical grounds. This is in part because the first premise he 
takes to be a metaphysical principle that is either self-evident or at least much more 
probable than its negation. That is, we do not seem to find in our experience of the world 
anything that would serve as a refutation of the principle, at least in the realm of sensible 
objects. This argument, however, has been objected to on both metaphysical and 
scientific grounds, and I will return to it later.9 And even though Craig thinks the first 
premise is fairly uncontroversial, I will engage it because his analysis of what it means to 
begin to exist is stated in terms of tensed facts, which only exist on the A-theory.  
 The argument’s conclusion receives the least attention, primarily because it 
follows from the first two premises. However, it is also a premise of its own in the 
general argument that this cause of the universe is, in fact, God. In the form just 
presented, this argument only goes so far in getting us to the conclusions of any particular 
theism, so I will not have much to say in this project about what can be said concerning 
the nature of the cause of the universe, save that such a cause is what we mean when we 
refer to God. All that I aim to show is that the universe has a cause that is outside of the 
universe itself.10
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9 See Morriston, Wes “Craig on the Actual Infinite” Religious Studies 38, pp. 147-166, 2002; and 
Morriston, “Beginningless Past, Endless Future, and the Actual Infinite” Faith and Philosophy Vol. 27, No. 
4, October 2010, pp. 439-450; and “Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument: Reply to Craig” Faith 
and Philosophy Vol. 19, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 233-244.
10 For more on this, see Craig, William Lane "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?"  
Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002):  94-105.
3. Whatever Begins to Exist Has a Cause of Its Existence
 As I previously mentioned, Craig does not spend a great deal of time on the first 
premise; this is largely because he thinks it is unnecessary.11 After all, Craig argues, this 
does seem to be a fairly obvious principle that is constantly confirmed in our experience 
and never refuted, and it is certainly more plausible than its negation. Nowhere do we 
have experiences of physical things coming into being without causes, so most people are 
willing to accept this empirical generalization.12 Indeed, in addition to the empirical 
confirmations, the ancient metaphysical principle ex nihilo, nihil fit seems nearly 
impossible to deny. However, not everyone is prepared to accept it uncontested, and 
Craig’s analysis of something’s beginning to exist turns out to require us to accept the A-
theory, so an analysis on B-theoretic language is necessary for my argument.  
 Here is Craig’s analysis of “beginning to exist”:13
 1. x begins to exist at t iff x comes into being at t.
 2. x comes into being at t iff (i) x exists at t, and the actual world includes no state 
 of affairs in which x exists timelessly, (ii) t is either the first time at which x exists 
 or is separated from any t* < t at which x existed by an interval during which x 
 does not exist, and (iii) x’s existing at t is a tensed fact.
Here we have a technical analysis for what it means to begin to exist, but it should be 
clear that this language will not do for the proponent of the B-theory of time. First, on 
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11 Craig, 1979, p. 141.
12 Some are tempted to appeal to quantum mechanics for a quick objection to the principle, and I will 
respond to these concerns in a later section.
13 Craig, William Lane and James D. Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument” The Blackwell 
Companion to Natural Theology, William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Eds. (Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 
2009).
this analysis, it is not immediately clear if on the B-theory time can “come into being,” 
since the reality of temporal becoming itself is denied.  However, some physicists (and 
presumably some B-theorists) do believe that the Big Bang model provides us with some 
initial state or singularity--however difficult to explain--that represents the very 
beginning of space and time itself. So it’s possible that this is only a  linguistic concern, 
since the Big Bang event may turn out to be the first moment of time.14 
 Second, Craig claims in (iii) that x’s existing at t has to be a tensed fact, but on the 
B-theory there are no tensed facts. True, there are temporally indexed facts about things 
existing earlier-than and later-than, but since these are tenseless, it seems we need a 
different notion of beginning to exist. It also seems to me that the necessity of (iii) only 
holds if one is an A-theorist about time. Otherwise, it seems to beg the question against 
the B-theorist about what it means for something to begin if the claim is that beginnings 
only happen on an A-theory. Why, for example, couldn’t x’s existing at t simply be a 
tenseless fact temporally indexed earlier-than every other moment? That is, x’s beginning 
to exist at t simply means that x exists at t and there is no moment t* < t at which x exists. 
 After all, even if I think the B-theory is correct, things themselves can fairly be 
said to begin to exist, even if their existence is ultimately tenseless. For example, there is 
a sense in which I have a beginning in time; I began at a time later-than Ronald Reagan’s 
presidential inauguration, and earlier-than George H. W. Bush’s. So even though the 
particular date of my birth is not tensed on the B-theory, it seems the event of my birth 
Metcalfe, Curtis, 2013, UMSL, p.10
14 I do not mean to sloppily suggest that the spacetime singularity is a sufficient explanation, but as Craig 
and Sinclair suggest, “It is fascinating to note that the recent history of cosmology can be mapped by 
attempts to overcome these singularity theorems” (2009, p. 180). That is, the singularity, though very 
unpopular and a matter for considerable concern, cannot be done away with easily. 
can be said to begin to exist. It is not the case that there is no temporal order to the B-
series. It is not as if, by being tenseless events, all of the above events surrounding my 
birth are simultaneous with one another. Indeed, certain events are earlier than others, and 
when they do, they begin earlier as well. 
 But none of this is exactly what Craig means by something’s beginning to exist, 
since, according to the B-theory, it is not true objectively at Ronald Reagan’s inauguration 
that I do not exist. The truth of that statement is perspectival to those simultaneous-with 
the inauguration event, but I exist tenselessly along with all other moments of time. This 
is part and parcel to the B-theory, so I maintain there must be something unique about a 
first moment of the universe that allows even a B-theorist to say “it begins.” 
 One way to understand this might be as follows. 
 1. x begins to exist at t if (i) x exists at t, and (ii) there is no moment earlier-than t 
 at which x exists.
Notice that clause (ii) can only be true of the first moment, because on B-time, all 
moments, once created, exist. That is to say, x can still begin to exist even if the moment 
of its beginning to exist is temporally indexed tenselessly. Another way to say this might 
be the way Sean Carroll has put it, that, “there was a time such that there was no earlier 
time.”15 Here, “there was a time” simply means that there is an earlier time, and need not 
be a tensed fact. This is of course not a very robust formulation, as Carroll suggests it in 
passing. But I think it actually comes somewhat close to what I want to argue, and this 
would be what we would consider the first moment of time (or spacetime), or the time at 
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15 Carroll, Sean, “Does the Universe Need God?” Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity, ed. 
James B. Stump and Alan Padgett, 2012; online at http://preposterousuniverse.com/writings/dtung/
dtung.pdf
which the universe begins to exist. Even if this time before which there was no time is 
supposed to exist tenselessly, I will show that tenseless time cannot be an actual infinite 
because it leads to absurdities that seem impossible to overcome. Therefore, if time and 
the universe are tenseless, but not infinite, they begin to exist.
 I mentioned earlier that Craig insists upon the A-theory as a necessary part of the 
kalam cosmological argument.  According to Craig, the argument “presupposes from start 
to finish an A-theory of time.”16 He claims that “the first moment of creation is not a 
tenseless instant at the head of a four-dimensional block but an evanescent moment that 
came to be and has passed away.” However, tenselessness does not seem to entail 
timelessness if the B-series is not actually infinite in the past. Even if tense is only 
linguistic, it does not follow that tenseless events are not still temporally bound. We 
imagine, for example, the first inch of a ruler as the beginning of the ruler, and as being 
indexed in a before-relation to the other marks “after” it on the ruler. But strictly 
speaking, there is no directionality to the ruler except for the one given to it by 
convention. The order in this case is perhaps not unlike the order that is imposed upon the 
B-series by something like cosmic expansion. There is nothing ontologically different 
about inch 1 or inch 10, but we still claim that the ruler “begins” with the first inch for the 
purpose of measuring. 
 Craig goes on to argue that, on the B-theory, 
  The universe began to exist only in the sense that the tenselessly existing 
  block universe has a front edge... There is in the actual world no state of 
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16 Craig, William Lane, ReasonableFaith.org, Question & Answer #168, “Beginning to Exist” 
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/beginning-to-exist#ixzz28R3CA0JI
  affairs of God existing alone without the space-time universe. God never 
  really brings the universe into being; as a whole it co-exists timelessly with Him.17
It is not clear, however, that this must be the case. Why would it be impossible for there 
be a state of affairs in which God exists changelessly and timelessly without the universe, 
and for there to be a first moment of creation in which God creates the B-series of events 
which include the first moment of cosmic inflation, and every other tenseless moment? If 
it is possible for the first moment of the B-series to exist a finite time ago in the past, then 
it seems we have a case for a first moment of time that is in need of a cause just as 
everything else which begins to exist. I am not convinced that the B-series is descriptive 
of a block universe that is not in need of an explanation; I am also not convinced that the 
universe on the B-theory can simply exist. 
 Instead, I am suggesting that there exists a universe, that time is a genuine feature 
of the universe, and that time is best described by the B-theory. But what I am also 
arguing is that the B-series is nevertheless not eternal and has only existed for a finite 
amount of time in the past. Even if the moment of the Big Bang exists tenseless, it need 
not have existed from all eternity. If that is the case, then if the first premise of the 
argument is true, that whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence, and if it is not 
past-eternal, the B-series is also in need of a cause of its existence. In other words, each 
moment in time began to exist, but not as these moments became “present.” Instead, they 
began to exist when the B-series itself began to exist. Therefore it remains true that each 
moment has a cause of its existence, that the universe began to exist, and that the universe 
has a cause of its existence, which is what we call God. 
Metcalfe, Curtis, 2013, UMSL, p.13
17 Ibid.
 4. On Infinite Temporal Regress and Premise 2
 Now, it will be helpful to see one way Craig develops the philosophical arguments 
for the second premise:18
 2. The universe began to exist.
  2.1 Argument from the impossibility of an actual infinite
   2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
   2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
   2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exit.
  2.2 Argument from the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite 
  by successive addition
   2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an 
   actual infinite.
   2.22 The temporal series of events is a collection formed by 
   successive addition.
   2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual 
   infinite.
It should be clear that at least 2.2 seems to rely on the truth of the A-theory, in that time is 
conceived of as a temporal series that is formed by successive addition. As such, I will 
not be using that line of argument, and so will not follow the exact outline. But, I will 
engage briefly the argument given in 2.1 in the following section.
 I will grant that an actual infinite cannot exist. According to 2.12, an infinite 
temporal regress of events is an actual infinite, and so an infinite temporal regress cannot 
exist. But this warrants some discussion. Recall the difference between an actual and 
potential infinite. An actual infinite is a totality, a completed series to which nothing can 
be added. This is why, as Craig notes, a collection formed by successive addition cannot 
Metcalfe, Curtis, 2013, UMSL, p.14
18 Craig & Sinclair, 2009, pp. 103-125.
be an actual infinite. We can always add another, and we will never reach the actual 
infinite. What we mean in such a case is that the collection we can form by successive 
addition is indefinite. 
 But suppose we run the argument in the “opposite direction,” that is, into the past. 
At what point would the temporal regress of events become infinite? The answer, of 
course, is that at no point would it become infinite. Every point in the past, no matter how 
far removed, would be a finite point before the present. It would be forever possible to 
add one more to the regress, and thus, it would never be an actual infinite. So either there 
are a finite number of past days, where the temporal regress comes to an end at some first  
day, or the temporal regress is a potential infinite, which we have said is unproblematic, 
even for Craig.
 Now, if a B-theorist believes the universe is past-eternal, then it is obvious that for 
her the temporal regress of events is actually infinite. Every moment exists ontologically 
on par with the present moment, and ex hypothesi the series is beginningless, endless, and 
exists all at once; an actual infinite. But Craig is arguing that on the A-theory an infinite 
temporal regress is an actual infinite, which is asymmetrical to his claim that an infinite 
collection of future events is a potential infinite. The future is only potentially infinite 
because we can never count to infinity, so the best that can be said is that it will forever 
move closer and closer to infinity, but will never reach the actual infinite. But why isn’t it 
the same with past events? 
 If we begin with the present and count backward all the past days, at no point will 
we find that we are an infinite number of days from the present. Indeed, every past 
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moment is always a finite number of days removed from the present, and that is just what 
we said constitutes a potential infinite. What we find is that, for Craig, the infinite 
temporal regress is an actual infinite because he includes as a part of his discussion the 
idea that the infinite temporal regress includes a beginningless series.19 That is, the past 
never begins, and is therefore actually infinite, and, he says, uncontroversially so. If the 
number of days have been adding up from all of eternity, then it is actually infinite. But 
even if this is right, an infinite temporal regress, of itself, does not force us into a 
beginningless series, because the infinite temporal regress is only potentially infinite 
unless we include the beginninglessness of the series. Likewise, an infinite number of 
future days does not refer to an actual infinite because no such thing can ever be 
accomplished, unless we add the idea that it is somehow, in fact, an endless future. The 
concept of an actually endless future is not part of the concept of “infinite succession,” 
because that succession is only potentially infinite by itself. 
 It appears that only with the addition of “beginningless” is it true that the temporal 
regress is actually infinite, but that makes it trivially true, and beginningless need not be 
included in the concept of an infinite temporal regress, because, as I have shown, an 
infinite temporal regress, by itself, is only potentially infinite. Therefore, all that 2.1 
really seems to say is that either the infinite temporal regress is merely potentially 
infinite, and therefore not actually infinite, or one must add the concept that the past is 
beginningless, and we can then turn to the other arguments against such a claim, such as 
Metcalfe, Curtis, 2013, UMSL, p.16
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the inability to traverse an infinite, and the other paradoxes involved with the existence of 
the actual infinite in reality.
 I have shown that even if an infinite temporal regress of events in not actually 
infinite, something like the A-theory of time does seem to be operative in Craig’s 
analysis, since it is only on a tensed view of time that we would have a true succession 
(or regression) of events, which in this case would be moments of time. On the B-theory, 
it seems time could be infinite without worrying about these objections, because it does 
not become infinite by successive addition, and since we do not “move through” time, 
there is no temporal regress going back in time. The various moments of time simply 
stand in tenseless relations to all the other moments. 
 I still maintain, with Craig, that the universe began to exist. This claim is 
defended both philosophically and scientifically, the latter of which I will turn to later. 
Rather than rehearse Craig or al-Ghazali’s many philosophical arguments against the 
eternality of the universe, I want to give a different sort of argument for the beginning of 
the universe, one that does not presuppose the A-theory, so I can show why the B-series 
must not be actually infinite.
5. Avicenna on the Actual Infinite
 So, to show that even on a B-theory the universe cannot be infinitely old, I turn to 
Avicenna, who, unlike al-Ghazali, is sympathetic to the idea of the infinite and the past 
eternity of the universe. My argument can be summarized as follows:
 1. Argument from Avicenna’s “Actually Infinite Essentially Ordered 
 Quantity” 
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  1.1 Quantities that are both whole and essentially ordered cannot exist as 
  actually infinite.
  1.2 On the B-series, time meets Avicenna’s wholeness and ordering 
  conditions.
  1.3 Therefore, on the B-series, time is not actually infinite.
 Avicenna, unlike Aristotle, believes the actual infinite is possible, though not 
without conditions. For example, where the kalam thinkers (and Craig) believe that an 
infinite series cannot be traversed, Avicenna simply holds that an infinite series cannot be 
traversed in a finite amount of time.20 That is, given an infinite amount of time, an infinite 
amount of moments can be traversed. But to think of the infinite in a different way, 
Avicenna asks us to consider two identical rigid beams, O and R, extending infinitely 
from Earth into space.21 Suppose first that we remove a section from R, say the section 
from Earth to the edge of our galaxy. We can call that section x. So then O remains the 
same, and R is said to be shortened by the distance of x. When we compare R after the 
removal of x to the first beam, O, we find some absurd results. First, it would be absurd if 
the two beams are both still infinite, and R is not shorter than O, since we just said that R 
was shorter than O by the length of x. If R turns out to be shorter than O, however, then R 
is no longer infinite, but is finite. But R would be finite because of the removal of x, 
which is also finite, and adding x back to R would then give us another finite--not 
infinite--length, since it would be the combination of two finite lengths, and the addition 
of two finite quantities always results in something finite. Either way, we find 
contradictions, so Avicenna thinks the material instantiation of an actual infinite cannot 
exist. It is sometimes suggested that set theory can help explain the absurdities involved 
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with thinking about infinity, but such an understanding does not appear to help us, since 
neither R nor x is a proper subset of O.
 What does this thought-experiment tell us about the possibility of an actual 
infinite with respect to time and the eternality of the universe? More specifically, what 
does this tell us must be the case if the B-theory of time is true? Are we committed to the 
existence of an actual infinite, according to Avicenna? Though Avicenna thinks an actual 
infinite can exist, he argues that the beam example shows that an “actually infinite 
essentially ordered magnitude” cannot exist.22 In order to be an actually infinite 
essentially ordered magnitude, a magnitude would first have to be whole, existing all at 
once. It could not have parts of itself, or members of the set of things that make it up that 
have passed away or do not yet exist. So, if the A-theory is true, time would not be an 
actually infinite quantity, because all the parts of time do not exist at once. Some of the 
parts no longer exist, while others do not yet exist. On the B-theory, however, we might 
argue that all of the parts do exist. There are no objectively past, present or future 
moments, since those notions are relative, so there are no proper parts of time, only those 
given by convention. So it seems that time on the B-theory can be treated as an actually 
infinite magnitude. 
 The second condition is that the quantity must be essentially ordered. Being 
essentially ordered means that “Each member in the set has some well-defined position 
relative to the other members, such that the whole set can be called ‘ordered.’”23 As we 
said earlier, this is how time is understood according to the B-theory. All the moments in 
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time (or of time) exist tenselessly all at once, and in particular relations to all the others. 
So we can imagine 2 identical B-series’ mapped onto the 2 rigid beams, and we can see 
that if what we removed from beam R (from Earth to the edge of our galaxy) could 
represent some set of years, say 1-500 CE, the same contradictions arise when we 
imagine the now-shorter B-series either not being any shorter, or by trying to return those 
years and get an infinite series back. Simply mapping the years onto the beams, which we 
can do because they are both whole and essentially ordered, shows the contradiction in 
imagining an actually infinite B-series. 
 That is, time on the B-theory seems to be whole, existing all at once, and ordered, 
in set positions relative to the other moments. Thus, the B-theory of time gives us, 
according to Avicenna, an actual infinite. Recall, though, that this infinite is just what 
Avicenna says cannot exist. The argument we got from the beam thought-experiment was 
that this type of infinite gave us absurd results and had to be abandoned. So by meeting 
these two conditions (being whole and being ordered), B-theory time as an actual infinite 
simply cannot exist. Thus, though an actual infinite is possible for Avicenna, an actual 
infinite with these conditions is not. 
 
6. Tenseless Existence, Timeless Existence, and Cosmic Inflation
 Thus far I have given a brief treatment to the historical context and the supporting 
arguments concerning the actual infinite. In doing so, I have inserted the B-theory at 
times to suggest that it is compatible with (at least) these parts of the kalam cosmological 
argument. It would be impossible to establish fully the case for the B-theory here, 
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especially because so much of that case rests on a linguistic analysis about the 
translatability of tensed sentences to tenseless ones. However, it is important to say a bit 
about the B-theory and its relationship to the way we are understanding time within the 
larger kalam cosmological argument, especially since I am attempting to generalize the 
argument in a way that it is compatible with the B-theory.
 One compelling reason we might have for accepting the B-theory and rejecting 
the A-theory is the implications of relativity, viz., that there is no privileged “now;” no 
privileged present moment. Recall that the A-theory, which is roughly the idea that what 
exists is the present, seems to suggest that there is, in fact, some present moment that is 
ontologically privileged over past and future moments. The relativity found in classical 
physics, however, makes this a notoriously difficult position to uphold.24 Craig has 
argued that we are not compelled to accept the B-theory of time as a result of Special 
Relativity, but his view is not the prevailing one.25 Other problems exist for the A-theory, 
such as understanding the rate of the “flow” of time from each present moment to the 
next, and understanding what counts as truthmakers for past (and possibly future) 
events.26 The goal here is not, however, to argue against the A-theory as much as it is to 
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establish the general arguments of the B-theory in a way that allows us to construct the 
kalam cosmological argument on a view of time according to the B-theory.
 The biggest difficulty for defending the possibility of the relationship between the 
B-theory and the kalam argument is that “beginning to exist” does not mean what we 
typically imagine it to mean, and I showed earlier the difficulty in constructing such an 
analysis. On the A-theory, “beginning to exist” is a common-language expression that 
claims exactly to describe the beginning of the universe.  Craig describes it as a moment 
that comes into existence and ceases to exist like all other moments in time. On the B-
theory, Craig argues, the first moment of the universe did not come to exist and then 
cease to exist, it is more like the front-edge of the tenselessly existing spacetime block of 
B-series temporal relations. 
 But this objection does not make it clear that the B-series involves an actual 
infinite, since if the series has a beginning at all, it has a limit, and is therefore not 
infinite. That is, if the second premise is that “the universe began to exist,” and it can be 
defended scientifically, then perhaps such a claim is compatible with time’s existing 
tenselessly. It appears to me that tenseless existence does not entail eternal existence. We 
can say that the universe began to exist, and we can do so even if the beginning is not a 
moment that is dynamic, but is rather the static first moment of time. In other words, to 
say that the universe began to exist on the B-theory is just to say that there is a time 
before which there is no time.27 And if there is such a moment, then time (and the 
universe) began to exist at a point in time earlier-than every other moment. So then, even 
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if the universe and time exist tenselessly, this is not the same as to say that they exist 
eternally, and there is therefore no beginningless series implied by this view of time. As I 
showed in earlier sections, the addition of beginningless existence is, in fact, an addition 
to the concept of tenseless existence. 
 To help see why, let us think about the arrow of time. Time appears to us to flow, 
and our commonsense conception of time is that it really is like it seems. It is sometimes 
argued that this phenomenon is so unmistakably real that if the B-theory cannot account 
for it, then the B-theory must be rejected.28 Although I do not claim to answer that 
question here, it is perhaps sufficient to think about the existence of cosmic inflation. The 
early universe is said to have undergone rapid expansion, and the Big Bang model seems 
to suggest that we are in an inflationary spacetime. This may or may not explain our 
experience, or it may be in need of further analysis, but it does give the universe a very 
real sort of directionality with respect to the so-called arrow of time. But before making 
the argument, I first want to motivate the reason it is helpful for my case. 
 The general form of my argument is as follows:
 2. Argument from the Beginning of the B-Series
  2.1. If there is no beginning to the B-series, then an actual infinite exists.
  2.2. An actual infinite does not exist. 
  2.3. Therefore, it is false that there is no beginning to the B-series.
  2.4. Therefore, there is a beginning to the B-series.
I have previously defended the notion of there being a beginning of the B-series because 
of (i) the impossibility of the actual infinite, and (ii) the argument given by Avicenna. I 
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now want to present an argument for the beginning of the B-series based on a 
consideration of cosmic expansion. 
 It is argued that our universe is expanding.29 If that is so, we can trace the 
expansion back in time (as classical physics typically does) to a point at which that 
expansion begins, what is known commonly as the singularity. I am not concerned here 
with any difficulties involved with explaining the singularity, because it seems obvious 
that something like a singularity emerges as we get back to a smallest period of 
expansion, and that is all I need for this argument.30 This picture of the universe might be 
put this way:
That is, at t=0, our universe is at the lowest level of expansion, and we can map that 
moment onto our timeline of B-series events. So, t=0 represents a time before which 
there is no time, and the corresponding amount of cosmic expansion represents a level of 
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t=0 t=n
| |
expansion smaller than which there was none. Just as there simply was no time prior to 
t=0, there was no expansion.
 It should be noted that this is not designed to be a spatialization of time itself, but 
if space can be described as expanding, and all of the moments of time are supposed to 
exist at once, then we can map those moments onto the expansion and the 
correspondence between the two, which shows that if we can have a first point of 
expansion it will correspond to a first moment of time. Indeed, here time is measured 
against the size of the universe, and as the expansion must “run back” to some smallest 
point of expansion, (since it cannot have been expanding from eternity), so the spatial and 
temporal series cannot be past infinite. Given this correspondence, whatever is true of the 
one series maps onto the other. Thus, as there is a size of the universe smaller than which 
there is none, there is a time before which there is no time. Or, to rephrase the original 
argument:
 2*. Argument from the Beginning of the Expansion of the Universe
  2.1*. If there is no beginning to the expansion of the universe, then an 
  actual infinite exists.
  2.2*. An actual infinite does not exist. 
  2.3*. Therefore, it is false that there is no beginning to the expansion of 
  the universe.
  2.4.* Therefore, there is a beginning to the expansion of the universe.
  
7. The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem and the Expansion of the Universe
 Thus far, I have primarily given reasons to suppose that the universe began 
because of the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite, since an actual infinite 
would exist in an infinitely old universe. These sort of arguments are all that are involved 
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in the kalam tradition, as our understanding of cosmology and the Big Bang model only 
dates back to about the middle of the last century. So then, if our philosophical arguments 
are sound, and given our best understanding of Big Bang cosmology, we should expect to 
find scientific evidence in support of our argument that the universe began to exist. 
 In 2003, Arvind Borde, Alan Guth, and Alexander Vilenkin authored a paper in 
which they argued that any spacetime that is on average expanding is past geodesically 
incomplete; that is, has a beginning.31 It is argued that our spacetime is one that is, on 
average, expanding, and that it therefore has a beginning. Although their analysis of the 
other competing theories of quantum cosmology are rather technical, they can be 
summarized as follows:32 (i) Inflationary spacetimes are past incomplete, (ii) Cyclic 
spacetimes are either incomplete or lead to thermal death, and (iii) Asymptotically static 
and oscillating universes suffer from quantum instability. Therefore Vilenkin argues that, 
probably, the universe had a beginning. He also notes, however, that incompleteness 
theorems such as the BGV Theorem do not tell us anything about those beginnings. So, 
even though on their view it is not clear how to interpret the beginning, I am here less 
concerned with interpreting the beginning as in simply establishing the likelihood of it. 
 Borde, Guth, and Vilenkin argue that inflationary cosmological models are 
“generically eternal to the future,” which I have explained is to say that they are 
potentially infinite. They ask about the symmetry of eternality into the past on an 
inflationary model. To arrive at their conclusion, they argue initially from only the 
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following assumption, that the Hubble parameter, H, is on average greater than 0, or Hav 
> 0. They conclude that, “with a suitable definition of H and the region over which the 
average is to be taken, we will show that the averaged expansion condition implies past-
incompleteness.”33
 Though extended discussion would take more space and expertise than I can offer, 
Craig and Sinclair offer three possibilities for interpreting quantum cosmologies 
generally:34 (i) creation from nothing, (ii) universe neither created nor destroyed; 
timelessly subsistent, and (iii) ultimately unexplained, since the initial conditions are not 
properly accounted for. Problems exist for each interpretation of these models, but what 
do they mean for the kalam cosmological argument? Recall that the first premise of the 
argument is that whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence, and the second 
premise is that the universe began to exist. Only interpretation (i) would damage our first 
premise, but as many have argued (and as I will show momentarily), the “creation from 
nothing” is not really nothing, but some state where the laws of quantum mechanics, at 
least, exist. Interpretation (ii) would seem to be a problem for the second premise of the 
kalam argument, but only if we take the mathematical models to be real descriptions of 
reality, and we have several philosophical arguments to show the impossibility of an 
actually infinite past. And (iii) does not suggest that the universe is past eternal, and is 
perhaps the most modest of the interpretations. Of course, nothing in the preceding 
should suggest that I am in possession of the correct interpretation of the models, or that 
positions have been even close to fully-outlined. But I do claim that there are compelling 
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scientific reasons (at least one of which is found in the BGV Theorem) for thinking that 
the universe cannot, in fact, be past eternal.
8. An Objection to the Causal Principle from Quantum Theory
 Without straying too far from the kalam cosmological argument or the B-theory of 
time, I want briefly to comment on what will surely seem to some an obvious objection to 
the causal principle. As I have presented it, there is virtually no reason to deny that 
whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence. However, as I also mentioned, not 
everyone has been eager to accept this, and some of the arguments against it have been 
from quantum theory and the idea that at that level, we do not have such a firm grasp on 
causality. This is no doubt true, but it is also not clear that this will be a problem for the 
kalam cosmological argument. 
 One such doubter of the causal principle suggested above, especially as it relates 
to the universe and the Big Bang, is physicist Paul Davies.35 He argues that the cause of 
the Big Bang is that “empty space itself exploded under the repulsive power of the 
quantum vacuum,” which he explains is part of the inflationary theory.36 This does not 
tell us where the energy in the vacuum came from, however, and Davies anticipates this 
objection. Understanding that a vacuum is not “nothing,” he argues that:
 According to the [inflationary] theory, the universe started out with essentially zero energy, and 
 succeeded in conjuring up the lot during the first 10-32 s. The key to this miracle lies with a most 
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 remarkable fact about cosmology: the law of conservation of energy fails in its usual sense when 
 applied to the expanding universe.37
There was, according to Davies, negative pressure in the inflationary period, causing the 
rapid expansion of the universe, and this is because: 
 The vacuum is nature’s miraculous jar of energy. There is in principle no limit to how much 
 energy can be self-generated by inflationary expansion. It is a revolutionary result at total variance 
 with the centuries-old tradition that ‘nothing can come out of nothing,’ a belief that dates at least 
 from the time of Parmenides in the fifth century B.C.38
That is, very simply, the universe is the cause of itself. Davies later states that “The 
central feature of quantum physics is the disintegration of the cause-effect link,” and that 
“at the atomic level matter and motion are vague and unpredictable.”39 But, as he also 
admits, vagueness and unpredictability are not the negation of causality. The link is less 
clear, but it would be a mistake to suppose that there was no causality at the atomic level. 
But as for the previous claims about zero energy and a self-causing universe, a few things 
can be said. 
 First, “essentially zero energy” is not “zero energy,” and it would be a mistake to 
equivocate between those two. There is a world of difference between the universe 
coming to be from nothing, and the universe coming to be from essentially nothing. In 
other words, it is not at all clear that this view of the inflationary model constitutes a 
violation of Parmenides’ principle that from nothing, nothing comes. Davies admits as 
much in the closing paragraphs of his paper: 
 For the physicist, however, empty space is a far cry from nothing: it is very much part of  the 
 physical universe. If we want to answer the ultimate question of how the universe came into 
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 existence it is not sufficient to assume that empty space was there at the outset. We have to explain 
 where space itself came from.40
Davies, then, who is no A-theorist, accepts the idea that space “came into existence” at 
some finite time in the past, and that it is not enough to suggest that space has been there 
all along. And if space is not infinitely old, then I argue that neither is the universe itself, 
and hence, as it is typically understood, neither is time. 
9. Conclusion
 As I have shown, Craig’s arguments assume--and sometimes depend upon--the 
truth of the A-theory of time. In the preceding I have argued that such a position is 
unnecessary. My project is important because on the version Craig advances, it seems the 
argument is only as strong as the arguments one can give for the A-theory. Therefore, if 
one is not persuaded by a tensed view of time, one has immediate grounds for rejecting 
an argument that might otherwise be compelling. This seems to sell the argument short, 
since a more general version of the argument, if successful, would make for a stronger 
case for this argument for the existence of God.
 It also seems curious to suggest that if God created the world a finite time ago, he 
created the A-series necessarily! Does this mean that God could not have created a finite 
time ago, and yet create time on a B-series? There doesn’t seem to be anything logically 
impossible about God creating at a finite time ago in the past, and for Him to have 
created time such that moments exist in tenseless relations instead of tensed ones, 
regardless of how difficult it might be to divorce ourselves from the perception of 
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temporal becoming. If God could have created the world and the entire B-series, it seems 
unnecessary to restrict the argument to one view of time. If the argument is that the only 
way God could create a B-series is for the B-series to exist timelessly with Him, this 
seems to place unnecessary restraints on God’s creative power, as well as misunderstand 
the fundamental difference between the B-series existing tenselessly and its existing 
timelessly, or eternally.
 I have therefore offered a brief survey of the historical argument from the 
medieval kalam tradition, and have given some of Craig’s recent arguments for his 
version of the argument  in (1) and (2), respectively. I have also tried to show that an 
analysis of “beginning to exist” can be given on the B-theory as well as the A-theory in 
(3). Moving to the second premise, I gave some of the arguments for the claim that the 
universe began to exist, and tried to clarify Craig’s discussion about the nature of an 
infinite temporal regress (4). I argued in (5) that Avicenna conceived of the infinite in a 
way that precludes time on the B-theory from being actually infinite. In (6) I gave the 
argument that if there is no beginning to the B-series, then an actual infinite exists, and 
since an actual infinite does not exist, it is false that there is no beginning to the B-series. 
In section (7), I showed how the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem gives us scientific 
evidence for the claim that the universe is not past-eternal. And finally, in (8), I briefly 
anticipated and rejected a type of objection to causality from quantum mechanics; 
namely, that according to quantum mechanics, the universe can come from nothing, or 
from itself. 
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 Ultimately, I claim that the premises given in the kalam cosmological argument 
are true, and that therefore, so is the conclusion. But contra Craig, I claim that the 
premises can be defended on the B-theory of time, which strengthens the argument 
against the superficial dodge that if the kalam cosmological argument requires the A-
theory, and if the A-theory is false, then the kalam cosmological argument is false. If I 
have been successful, this response will not do, and I will have given a stronger, more 
general argument in support of the kalam cosmological argument.
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